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NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to recover a money judgment for the value 
; an aircraft damaged in an emergency landing near the Salt Lake 
:;ty Airport. The plaintiffs, Donald A. Dyson, Stephen F. Kesler, 
T. Bissell, Ronald McClain, Donald L. Oborn, Elmo Walker and 
:ary Ferguson (Owners) sued the defendant pilot, Kenneth R. Shannon 
::,annon) on the grounds of negligence and defendants Aviation 
::ice of America, Incorporated (AOA) the general insurance agency 
,:.d Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger), the hull liability carrier, 
:. the grormds that AOA and Ranger failed to acknowledge insurance 
:•;erage placed by the Dysons, their ostensible agent. AOA and 
'mger then filed a Third-Party Complaint ag~inst Dysons alleging 
::at if AOA and Ranger \vere liable to the Owners, Dysons were 
~able to them for negligence and breach of duty as local agents 
:c AOA and Ranger. 
The Owners also filed an action directly against the Dysons 
.. :eging that the Dysons agreed to secure coverage rmder the policy 
:. question while the aircraft: was being piloted by Shannon, but 
ded to do so. The Dysons t:hen filed a Cormterclaim against AOA 
:d Ranger in the latter's third-party action alleging that if 
·sons '>Jere held liable to the Owners, AOA and Ranger were liable 
:them for not endorsing Shannon as a covered pilot on the policy 
·question as Dysons had requested. 
DISPOSITION I~ LOI·iER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of AOA and Ranger 
-~ers' Complaint, but entered judgment in favor of Owners and 
-l-
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against Dysons on Owners' Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint 
against Dysons. The trial court further entered judgment in favor 
of AOA and Ranger and against Dysons on Dysons' Counterclaim agains: 
AOA and Ranger. 
Prior to trial, the trial court on motion of the other part:e 
but without hearing, struck Dysons' demand for jury trial as being 
untimely. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Donald A. Dyson, as one of the Owners, seeks rever: 
of the trial court's judgment in favor of AOA and Ranger on plain-
tiffs' Complaint; and Donald A. Dyson and L. F. Dyson & Associates, 
as third-party defendants and counterclaimants, seek reversal of 
the trial court's judgment against them in favor of AOA and Ranger 
on Dysons' Counterclaim and pray that the trial court be directed 
to enter judgment in favor of Dysons against AOA and Ranger in tte 
sum of any judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs against thee 
Alternatively, Dysons seek remand of the case to the trial 
court for trial by jury pursuant to Dysons' demand therefor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about March 18, 1975, the five original O'..mers, plai:c· 
tiffs herein, purchased a 1968 Cessna aircraft which was financed~~ 
Walker Bank & Trust Company (Ex. 36). On March 21, 1975, Donald 
A. Dyson, one of the original Owners -,.,ho was also an J.nsurance age:1: 
-2-
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;JJlitted an Application For Aircraft Insurance to AOA (Ex. 4). 
E is an underwriting group which specializes in writing aviation 
:csurance for approximately 65 insurance companies that offer avia-
·:on coverages (R. 568). The application indicated that the insured 
;,;as to be Donald A. Dyson and that Donald A. Dyson and Jim Breeze, 
::.FAA instructor, were to be the named pilots, with "Additional 
::ots to be added as they qualify" (Ex. 4). AOA placed the coverage 
:~Ranger and policy ~o. AC Al-198882 dated April 1, 1975 was 
.:s·Jed effective as of ~!arch 26, 1975 for a one-year period (Ex. 3) 
!I 
.::a total premium of $7C.8. ClO (Ex. 5). 
All of the original 0wners except ~1cClain were present a': 
·.e time financing T.Vas arranged at \.Jalker Bank and understood that 
·son would secure insurance on the aircraft in the amount of their 
··:estment, $27,000.00 (R. 356, 362-363, 383). 
At the time of the application in question, AOA operated 
·:ough a loca:!. general agency at Cody, I.Jyoming known as Aviation 
o:.eral Agency (AGA) to make their market more attractive to insur-
·:e agencies in this area (R. 573). :1rs Cartwright, the underwriter 
:handled the policy in question at the Dyson agencv submitted 
; application for coverage on the aircraf: in ques':ion to AOA 
:o:.1gh AGA and dealt with AGA for some time thereafter on matters 
'-a::ing to the polic:1 (R. C.79). Prior to the accident in question, 
'started dealing directly with AOA as she had done prior to the 
:ablisnment of ,lJ";A 
-_)-
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The Dyson agency had been writing aviation coverage throug: 
AOA with Ranger since approximately February 14, 1968 when an 
Agency Agreement was executed between AOA/Ranger and Dyson (Ex. 2) 
This agreement provides, inter alia, that: 
Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing 
the Agent to commit or bind the Company to any 
liability without prior approval of Aviation 
Office of America, Inc. 
The agency agreement was not modified in writing prior to the date 
of the loss in question (R. 385). Donald Dyson contended that by 
practice and usage, this limitation was modified about October 19;j 
(R. 507-511) when AOA/Ranger began to put into effect their memo 
requests, effective as of the date of the request. 
The office procedure followed by AOA in handling a mailed-
in application to add a pilot to an existing policy is that the 
application is received and opened in the mail room and then dis-
tributed to the underwriting department (R. 570); an undePNTiter 
will then review it and initial it for approval and route it to 
the policy writing department (R. 680) where the endorsement is 
typed in final form. Since the underwriter does not note a date 
when he initials the application as approved, the typist, in the 
absence of other instruction, will type the endorsement effective 
as of the date of the application requesting it. (R. 680). 
Mr. Tom Dougherty, a Senior Vice-President at AOA. is in 
charge of the underwriting department (K. 568). Prior to trial. ~e 
reviewed AOA' s filed regarding the Dyson agency ('Z 6 33). He 
-4-
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.:~nowledged that it was the practice of the AOA underwriting 
:2nrtment '-'hen writing an endorsement to add a pilot to an 
,;.:~sting policy to make the endorsement effective as of the date 
:the application requesting the endorsement, if no other date 
~ requested in the application and if the application contained 
:J information necessary to rate the risk (R. 612). In every 
5tance this would result in back-dating the effective date of 
:.·.e endorsement because the endorsement would always be typed in 
.:•A's office at a date later than the application requesting it 
;s ty?ed in the agent's office (R. 612). Depending on the amount 
:activity going on with respect to a particular policy, such 
;c~-dating may amount to as much as a couple of months (R. 615). 
Although Mr. Dougherty was reluctant to 2dmit that there 
;:e no exceptions to the aforementioned practice, after review of 
:.; files regarding transactions with the Dyson agency, he was 
:.a':Jle to cite any instances to the contrary (R. 611, 672-675). 
In those instances where the initial application did not 
:"'ain all necessary infor.:~ation to rate the risk, the endorsement 
:·::d be back-dated from the issue date in AOA' s office to the date 
·en the additional information was sent to AOA from the agent's 
::ce (R. 670). The only instance '-"hich l'!r. Dougherty could find 
·a review of AOA files regarding the Dyson agencv where AOA had not 
.:eoted a risk as requested by Dyson was a situation where coverage 
~~een reque5ted for an ~nsured in the business of repairing and 
:::.lding damaged aircraft •..;ho wanted coverage •.,;hile transporting 
=~aircraft in their dama;;ed condi:ion (R. 654). 
-5-
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The history of activity on the policy in question in adding 
pilots atter the initial writing is substantially as follows: 
Re: STEPHEN KESLER. Mrs. Mary Cartwright of the Dyson 
agency requested his addition by telephone call and follow-up memo 
of July 21, 1975 to Dave Brannon at AGA (Ex. 8). Mr. Brannon by 
telephone call and memo of July 21, 1975 to underwriter Tom Dougherty 
at AOA requested coverage effective July 22, 1975 (Ex. 7). On 
August 20, 1975, AOA sent a memo to Dysons requesting certain pilot 
experience information (Ex. 9). The requested information was sent 
to AOA, date uncertain, but prior to September 17, 1975 when AOA 
advised Dysons by memo (Ex. 10) that an endorsement adding Kesler 
was being typed that date. The endorsement was issued September 
17, 1975, effective as of July 22, 1975 (Ex. 11). 
Re: TIM BISSELL. Mrs. Cartwright requested his addition 
by memo to Mr. Brannon at AGA on August 26, 1975 (Ex. 6). On 
September 17, 1975, AOA sent a memo (Ex. 10) requesting advice as 
to Bissell 1 s first name [although it was noted on Hrs. Cartwright's 
memo to AGA]. On September 24, 1975, Sara Broughton, assistant 
underwriter at AOA (R. 575) 1 penned a reply note requesting pilot 
experience forms (see Exhibit 12) to Mrs. Cartwright's memo of 
August 26, 1975, which she had sent to AGA, who apparently forwardec 
the same to AOA. By memo of November l3, 1975 (Ex. 26), the pilot 
experience form for Bissell (Ex. 13) '.-las sent to AOA by Mrs. Cart·,,r:; 
AOA issued the endorsement adding Bissell on December 2, 1975, effec-
~ive as of Novebmer 13, 1975 (Ex. 14) 
-6-
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Re: GARY FERGUSON. On December 4, 1975, Mrs. Cartwright 
:nt a memo with pilot experience form attached (Ex. 15) directly 
:J l·!r. Dougherty at AOA. At that time, Mrs. Cartwright had been 
';mished a supply of Pilot Experience Forms (R. 439) [per her 
::quest to AOA of November 5, 1975 (Ex. 20)]. Without further 
:Jmmunication, AOA issued the endorsement (Ex. 16) adding Ferguson 
.:. December 10, 1975, effective as of December 4, 1975. 
Re: KE~ETH SHAllliON. On December 8, 1975, Mrs. Cartwright 
=~t a memo with pilot experience form attached (Ex. 17) directly 
:Tom Dougherty at AOA. The records of Dyson reflect no response 
::his request prior to February 1, 1976 when the aircraft crashed 
·.:le being operated by Kenneth Shannon (R. 441). Mrs. Cartwright 
·::alls two telephone conYersations with Mr. Dougherty at AOA 
:;arding other policies [Reynolds and Rich] prior to the accident 
:en she mentioned that they were still waiting on Shannon's endorse-
::ct (R. 442). In both instances, she recalls Mr. Dougherty saying 
:would check on it and get it out. No mention was made of Shannon 
::being acceptable as a pilot (R. 442). Mr. Dougherty has no 
::ollection of the telephone calls (R. 598). His files do reflect 
'~ephone calls with respect to these individuals. Both Mrs. Cartwright 
;~ 
·.: :·lr. Dougherty agree that there was a telephone call regarding 
·eRich policy on December 16, 1975 (R. 6 35) . but Mr. Dougherty 
:ctends that the telephone call regarding Reynolds occurred after 
~accident in question (R. 635). Mr. Dougherty's telephone notes 
·:~ese calls in the particular files do not reflect an inquiry 
-7-
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regarding the Shannon endorsement and he has no independent recol-
lection whether or not the Shannon request was mentioned (R. 599). 
Upon being advised of the accident, Hrs. Cartwright reportec 
the same to AOA by telephone WATTS line (R. 422) and confirmed with 
a First Notice of Claim dated February 2, 1976 (Ex. 18). 
On February 15, 1976, Mrs. Cartwright sent a follow-up memo 
(Ex. 19) regarding the memo of December 8, 1976 requesting the 
endorsement of Shannon and mentioned that Dyson had sold his interes: 
in the aircraft to Shannon. 
On March l, 1976 Mr. Dougherty had a telephone conversation 
with Mr. Tom Lehman, an AOA claims examiner (R. 60 3) . Mr. Dougher::: 
made notes of the conversation (Ex. 31), which he interpreted in 
the record as follows: 
Has heard from agent. Been selling interest in 
aircraft, but did not add as insureds at time of 
loss. Insured had no insurable interest. To deny 
loss. Answer memo, did not add pilot because no 
reply to Sara B. 12/15 memo. 
On that same date, March l, 1976, Mr. Dougherty replied to ~trs. 
Cartwright's memo of February 15, 1976 as follows: 
l. Please note that we quoted the amount of 
premium required to add pilot, but did not 
receive a response. 
2. It is not customary to assign policies, 
and you would need approval of the company 
in advance. 
Because of open claim, have passed this informa-
tion to claims, ref. #17046. (Ex. 30). 
On March 3, 1976, Mr. Dougherty received a telephone call 
from Mary Cartwright responding to Mr. Dougherty's memo o!' >'arch l. 
-8-
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_);6. Hr. Dougherty's notes (Ex. 32) indicate that Mrs. Cartwright 
:civised him that she had not received Sara Broughton 1 s memo of 
:ecember 15, 1975, that Mr. Dyson had not completed transfer of 
-.:s interest in the plane to Shannon as yet and that she wanted 
.Jknow the status of the endorsement and whether or not the claim 
Js affected. The note then indicates he would check with Torn 
:eh.Qan and the bottom portion of the note reads as follows: 
Torn Lehl:lan digging in r..;ith atto!l1ev-------To 
be denied. Hill have written insured in a week--
do not co=it. (R. 607). 
The ~ecernber 15, 1975 meQO of Sara Broughton referred to 
.)ove, which ~1rs. Cartwright stated she had not received and ,.;1---:.c:!: 
:uld not be found in Dysons 1 policy file, was appended to l1rs. 
·artwright 1 s memo of December 8, 1975 requesting the endorsement 
:Shannon. The message portion of Mrs. Cartwrig~t's memo reads 
; follows: 
We enclose a pilot experience form completed by 
Kenneth Richard Shannon who is to be included as 
a pilot under the above captioned policy. We 
would appreciate your endorsement to this effect. 
Thanks. 
(Signed ~1ary) 
--.e hand r,.;ritten memo of Sara Broughton as it appea:::-s on AOA's file 
:?y reads as follows: 
This risk has reached a flying club exposure. To 
add this pilot it will be a fullv earned premium 
of $100.00. Please advise if yo~ want him added. 
-9-
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Sara Broughton, by deposition, test~ied she is an under-
writer at AOA (R. 732) and that she wrote the bottom portion of 
what is now Exhibit 34 and "mailed it back to the agent" (R. 739-740) 
Mail generated by the underwriting department is turned over to 
the mail room people. According to Mr. Dougherty, Sara Broughton 
would not be an individual who would actually put mail in a U.S. 
Mail receptacle (R. 609) . 
The case was originally set for trial on September 19, 1977, 
and on September 14 counsel for appellants served by delivery a de~nd 
for jury trial on the other parties and filed the same on September 
15 (R. 201-202). On September 15 and 16, counsel for the other 
parties filed and served variously denominated documents, objecting 
to appellant 1 s demand for jury trial. On September 16 the Court ruled 
on said objections, without hearing, and advised counsel that appellant 
demand for jury trial was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants Dyson recognize that on appeal any disputed facts 
upon which conflicting evidence was received must be construed in 
favor of the trial court 1 s findings and judgment. However, appellants 
contend that the trial court erred in assessing the legal effect 
of the testimony of AOA 1 s witnesses on cross-examination, and that 
pursuant to such undisputed testimony, appellants are entitled to 
judgment over against respondents AOA/Ra!lgcr ::..:-. ::::e :::a:-.n 2 :- oi: ?l;;:!.n-
tiffs' judgment against Dysons. 
-10-
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POINT I 
THE PRACTICE OF A..'l I:~SURANCE COHPANY 
IN BACK-DATI:1G ENDORSEMENTS FOR 
COVERAGE TO THE DATE OF ru'l AGENT'S 
REQ1'EST AHOUNTS TO EXTEiiDING BINDING 
AUTHORITY TO THE AGENT. 
As an abstract principle, respondents do not seriously 
~tend the proposition that if an insurance company adopts the 
:actice of back-dating endorsements for additional insurance coverage 
l ~e dates that the soliciting agent requested the coverages, that 
,d ::e company has in fact impliedly extended binding authority to the 
~nt. Rather, respondents deny that they adopted such a practice. 
The rational for the foregoing proposition is discusoed in 
::ail in Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Companv, 239 A. 2d 4 (New Jersey 
!d .'68). In that case, the agent admittedly gave an oral binder to 
mt··.e insured for fire coverage of certain ?Yer.ises ccn August 27. 
:e company contended that it had rejected the application on 
:Jtember 4. The insured suffered a fire less on September 5. 
·.e col!lpany' s letter of rejection reached the agent on September 6. 
:e company declined coverage and denied that the agent had binding 
::horitv. The insured sued both the agent and the company. :s • 
Although there was a substantial dispute as to whether or 
:the company [Travelers] had ever expressl:; authorized the agent 
:bind it in the area of inland ~arine coverages, the Supreme Court 
::lew Jersey specified in its opinion. "\,je accept the premise that 
~velers never in so ~anv words authorized the agents to bind a 
-11-
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risk in that category." The Court then explained that the case 
turns upon the admitted fact that the company had accepted some 
300 inland marine risks submitted by the agents over a period of 
years and in each case had back-dated the policy as of the date 
requested on the application for whatever coverage was sought as 
of that time. 
Travelers took the position that back-dating is a uniform 
practice in the industry and does not bespeak authority in the agent 
to issue a binder, but means only that if Travelers should decide 
to accept the application, coverage will attach retroactively to 
the date requested in the application. With respect to such 
explanation, the Court stated: 
Under tha.t view, the applicant would hold the 
interim risk if Travelers should reject the appli-
cation after a loss, while Travelers, if it issued 
the policy, would obtain a full premium for the 
period during which it held the option to accept 
or reject the application even though at the 
time of acceptance Travelers knew there had been 
no loss and of course no risk . 
. . . The unfairness of an undisclosed option in 
the company is evident. [Authority cited]. Equally 
obvious is the room for overreaching either by an 
ag~nt eager to get the business or by a company 
wh~7h learns of a loss before acting on the appli-
cat~on. 
The Court then held with respect to the insured's claim against 
Travelers as follows: 
For these reasons the cases hold that a practice 
0 ., t..acl- ~ ~· t'- ,. ' .~ ~ ~-ua~~n~ .•& po~Lcy to tne date requested 
~n the appllcatlo~ spells ~ut 2~thc~i~y in the 
age~t to give a binder for interim coverage pending 
act~on upon the application [Authorities cited]. 
-12-
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In that case, Travelers had not appealed from the trial 
;::t' s judgment in favor of the insured against it, but only of 
-_ 2 :rial court's refusal to permit indemnification over against 
-2 agent. With respect to the company v. agent dispute, the 
·;::t noted: 
The cases just cited deal with a controversy be-
tween the applicant and the carrier. As we noted 
earlier, Travelers did not appeal from the judgment 
the applicant obtained against it. The question is 
whether those cases are also meaningful when the 
carrier turns to the agent for indemnification. 
I.Je think they are, for although it was unnecessary 
in those cases to decide whether the carrier was 
liable because the agent's aut:writy -...,as merely 
"apparent" rather than implied in fact and there· 
fore actual, nonetheless, ultimate basis for those 
cases would equally support a finding of authority 
as between the agent and the principal. We say 
this beca~se the theme was not that the fact of 
agency itself necessarily excluded aPparent authority 
to bind the risk, but rather that i~ was the corn-
an?' s Practice of back-datin '"'hi.;:\ i::mcrted the 
existence ot aut oritv to in . It sue con uct on 
the part of the principal could reasonable lead the 
agent too to believe he has authoritv to bind the 
risk, then the principal should be e~ually charge-
able with the i~olication of its conduct in a 
controversy with. the agent. 
In short, an agent is in fact authori=ed to do 
",...,hat" it is reasonable for hi:n to infer that the 
principal desires him to do in light of the princi-
pal's manifestations and the facts as he knows or 
should knm.J t::Ce~ :1t the time he acts,'' Restateoent 
(Second) of Agenc:: (1955), §33. p. 115; and ' . .;ith 
exceptions not here relevant, ":1uthority to do an 
act can be created bv ~citten or spoken words or 
other conduct of the. orincio:1l whi~h. reasonably 
interoreteo, c:1using the agent to believe that the 
principal desires h~m so to act on :he principal's 
accot.:nt," Rest:lte"!ent (Second) of Agencv (1958), 
§26, 100. AnJ if the authori=ation is ambiguous, 
the a ent '1:1s J c",orit" to :let in a.ccordance with 
~.v h t e :- ~ 2 3 ,_: n c.l : ·: b 12 : -_:__ t.: ~: e s : '--' ::, e ~<1 e ~,..; i h o f t !1 e 
tJ:- nc p.J l e'.ren ~(-,~::::~~ i: -:._s c2n:::ra;:·.r ::'-' he princioal' s 
ac 'J:l lntcent :.'-iJt:c•''--~c'! citc>·lj. (f::mp aSlS added)· 
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The Court then discussed the practical business purposes for 
the back-dating practice between company and agent as tollm-Js: 
Curran [Agent] testified that he was lead by the 
practice of back-dating to believe that he was 
authorized to bind the risk while Travelers con-
sidered the application. We see no reason to doubt 
the truthfulness of that testimony or the reason-
ableness of that belief. As we have already said, 
it would be unreasonable to expect an applicant for 
insurance to give any one company an option, inde-
finite as to time, to decide whether to sell coverage 
retroactively with the applicant holding an interim 
risk. The practice of back-dating the policy which 
would lead the applicant to believe the agent is 
authorized to bind the risk, if no more were show~, 
lead an agent to the same estimate of his authority. 
That conclusion is so strongly required that an insurer 
could escape it only through the plainest instruc-
tions to the agent to tell an applicant for immediate 
coverage in so many words (1) that the interim loss 
will fall upon the applicant if the application is 
rejected by the company; (2) the period of time "'ithin 
which the company will act on the application; (3) the 
objective standard upon which the company will weight 
the application, or the absence of such a standard; 
and (4) that a premium will be charged at the full 
rate for the period of retroactive coverage if the 
policy should issue. He doubt that a company which 
so instructed its a ents would remain com etitive. 
We o not suggest that sue instructions wou bar 
the applicant if the agent failed to abide by them. 
Rather the point is that a principal, who as in this 
case, wants to shift the interim insurance risk to the 
agent because he failed to inform the applicant would 
have,t? a~ert the,agent to that consequence bv such 
expl~c~t ~nstruct~ons. (Emphasis added). 
The Court then went on to hold with respect to the company v. agent 
dispute: 
We prefer to hold that a practice of back-dating 
policies to the date requested in the application 
~mplies, as between principal and agent, authority 
~n ~h~ agent to bind a risk pending the principal's 
dec~s~on on the application. 
-14-
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Lastly, ~ith respect to Travelers contention, as AOA's in 
;e instant case, that the written agency agreement between <.:he 
::::~pany and agent barred a grant of authority other than by writing, 
:'.e Court stated: 
The foregoing case is in accord with the law of several 
:her jurisdictions regarding the practice of back-dating as stated 
:Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 26:198 which reads as follows: 
There is authority that an agent, empowered to 
bi~d the co~any by contracts of insurance, has 
authority to bind it by a preliminary or temporary 
contract of insurance. Authoritv to enter into 
contracts o:' interim insurance ma;'T be implied from 
the custom of the insurer of datin olicies as of 
t e ate ot t. e aop lcation, or in such case t e 
agent taking the application has implied or apparent 
authority to make a valid preliminary contract of 
insurance, e:'fective from the making of the appli-
cation until its acceptance or rejection, although 
the application provides that the company shall 
not be bound bv anv act done or statement made bv 
any agent, not-authorized by or contained in the. 
application, and not~ithstanding the application also 
recites that it is subject to the approval of the 
company, othenvise in the case of loss subse uent 
~o ~he ao~lication an orior to its acceptance or 
re'ection the i~s~re~ ~Jould ~ot be cove~ed, whereas 
i loss ha not occurre urin~ s~ch a perio . he 
would. in case ot acceotance ot the risk. have had 
to oav a :Jre:ni·JJTI covering it. (Emphasis added). 
-lS-
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However, Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Company, supra, is particula~b 
significant in the instant dispute since it also deals with the 
question of indemnity between agent and company. 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out in Lewis v. 
Travelers, supra, an insurance company could not remain competitive 
if it required its agents to give the type if instructions necessary 
to avoid the legal consequences of back-dating policies and endorse-
ments. Mr. Dougherty, AOA's Senior Vice-President in charge of 
underwriting, acknowledged in his testimony that an insurance agent 
must be able to promptly meet the needs of his insurance clients and 
that if an insurance company did not allow its agents to supply that 
kind of service, the agents would be looking for other companies 1-1it: 
which to write their insurance (R. 572-573). This is obviously the 
reason AOA/Ranger back-dates its endorsements as of the date of its 
agents' requests. 
With respect to the question of whether or not the Dyson 
agency could have reasonably believed that AOA/Ranger wanted Dyson 
to represent to its insurance customers the capability of providing 
immediate coverage, Mr. Donald Dyson testified that since about 
October 1970 when AOA/Ranger commenced acting upon his memo requests 
in connection with the J. D. Air Service Account, that AOA/Ranger 
had always issued endorsements to an existing policy effective as 
of the date of request, if sufficient information was submitted to 
rate the risk (R. 507-518, 525-528). Similarly, Mrs. Mary Cartwr~gh 
an underwriter in the Dyson agency, testified that to the oest of 
-16-
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-2:- memory, AOA/Ranger had alwa?S back-dated endorsements to the 
;;te of her request if all necessary information to rate the risk 
;s submitted with the application for the endorsement during the 
·dod she worked for the Dyson agency (R. 470). Mrs. Cartwright 
;rked for the Dyson agency from March 1970 to April 1977 (R. 474-475). 
Such course of conduct was certainly the case with respect 
:J the policy in question. The addition of Stephen Kesler was first 
:;c_uested by :-!rs. Cart,-rright in a telephone call to Mr. Brannon 
.:AGA who relayed the cequest by telephone call to Mr. Dougherty 
,: AOA, both of which •..;ere confirmed by r:1emos. However, AOA requested 
2:-tain pilot inforr:Jation •..;hich ·..;as subsequen::l:: fu::-:-:ishei a 
:e:: the endorsement of Kesler \-Jas actually issued on September 17, 
;75, it was back-dated effective as of July 22, 1975 as initially 
.,,.Jested (Ex. ll). Hith respect to the adci::i::m of Tim Bissell, 
:.e pilot experience for:!! was :on.;arded, after request by AOA, by 
:,Jo dated ~ove:r.ber 13, 1975 and the endorsement when typed on 
:cember 2, 1975, was back-dated effective :lover:1ber 13, 1975, the 
::e the information •..;as for..;a:-ded b:1 ;:)yson (Ex. 14). By the time 
:the request to add Gar? Ferguson, :-!rs. Cartwright has secured a 
lpply of the pilot experience forms and submitted one directly with 
·e ~e~o request to add Gary Fe:-guson on December 4, 19;5_ Without 
.:-:her comr.runic-1tio:1, AOA issued the endorst:oent adding Ferguson on 
'~er:Jbe:- 1'). 1975, ~ack-daci:"lg it effective as of December 4, 1975 
.. , 16). ' . .;i:::-: :-es~ec:: ::·o :':c:-'.::e::h 5:-:a:-::-:cr., ::he :;:e~o application 
.:~ pilot e:qerience for:-~ a::::ac~1ed •.-1as sent 'ov ~Irs. Cartwright to 
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AOA on December 8, 1975 only two days before the Ferguson application 
was acted upon and back-dated by AOA. Consi~ering that the Ferguson 
application would have been received back in the Dyson office shortly 
after December 10, 1975 showing an effective date as of the date of 
memo application of December 4, 1975, Mrs. Cartwright had every 
reason to believe that the Shannon application of December 8, 1975 
would be acted upon in due course in the same manner. 
Knowing of the contention of Dyson that AOA/Ranger had 
established a practice of back-dating requests for coverage effective 
as of the date of the request and of the contention that AOA had 
always accepted Dysons requests for coverage, AOA's Mr. Dougherty 
had reviewed his agency's files with respect to policies written 
through the Dyson agency and was able to offer in rebuttal to such 
contentions only the example of an application for insurance coverage 
which had been refused because the applicant who was in the business 
of repairing and selling damaged aircraft wanted to insure such 
aircraft while they were being flown in their damaged condition 
to his location for repairs (R. 654). Appellants contend that such 
example is clearly distinquishable from the situation at bar 
where the aircraft in question had already been accepted for coverage 
and the matter at issue was merely the adding of additional pilots 
to the policy as they qualified for coverage. 
Also, the holding in Travelers that the expressed terms of 
the agency agreement between the company ~nd ~gent couid be ~odified 
by subsequent conduct is in accord with Utah law. As stated in 
PLC Landscape Construction v. Picadilly Fish-'n Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 
-18-
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~ 350, 502 P.2d 562 (1972) this Court observed: 
... there is nothing so sacrosanct about having 
entered into one agreement that it will prevent 
the parties entering into any such change, modi-
fication, extension or addition to their agreement 
for doing business with each other that they may 
mutually agree. That is what appears to have 
happened here and such subsequent agreements are 
governed by the same rules as to proof and 
enforceability as the original agreement. 
·:.is is true, even if the original agreement provided by its terms 
::.at it could not be subsequently amended as stated in Davis v. 
;vne and Dav, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P. 2d 337 (1960) and affirmed 
.::Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 
j62): 
It isawell-established rule of law that parties 
to a written contract may modify, waive, or make 
new te~s notwithstanding terms in the contract 
designed to hamper such freedom. 
Appellants respectfully submit that a:: elements that controlled 
; Travelers are present in the instant case, except that in Travelers 
~ course of conduct of back-dating policies alleged by the agent 
:confer binding authority upon him was proven by some 300 examples 
:back-dating, whereas in the instant case, the practice of back-
·'ting endorsements was admitted by AOA' s senior vice-president in 
·arge of underr.rriting, as noted in the follo,ving point. 
POINT II 
AOA AND RA..\lGER ARE CONCLUSIVELY BOUND 
BY THEIR ADHISSiml OF BACK-DATI~G 
E~IDORSE;.!ENTS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE 
OF THE AGE~n' S REQUESTS FOR SUCH ENDORSE-
;.!E~TS PRIOR TO THE LOSS I~ QUESTION. 
Since the commencec.ent o: th~s action, it has been Dyson's 
:sition that ADA/Ranger ef:ectivel•: granted the Dyson agency binding 
-~~-
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authority with respect to modifying existing policies by a course 
of conduct of accepting Dyson's applications for endorsement ann 
back-dating the endorsement effective as of the date of the Dyson 
memo requesting the modification. However, Dysons did not antici-
pate that AOA's witness, Tom Dougherty, Senior Vice-President in 
charge of underwriting, would actually admit on cross-examination 
that it was, without exception to the contrary [insofar as he was 
able to document], the practice of AOA to back-date endorsements 
to policies and all information necessary to rate the risk was 
submitted with the application. Some of Mr. Dougherty's testimony 
on this point was as follows: 
Q. Let me back up. What I am asking is, you know of 
no instance where the effective date of the 
endorsement making the change or adding, whatever 
was to be added, was not made effective as of the 
date of request by the agent if that request 
contained all of the information necessary by 
the underwriting department to rate the risk? 
A. I will agree. (R. 612). 
* * * 
Q. You heard Mr. Dyson's testimony on Tuesday, where 
he stated that to his knowledge that was the 
practice. That the effective date of the endorse-
ment was always the date of the request when the 
request contained all of the information, did you 
not? 
A. I heard that. 
Q. And I suppose you went through your files insofar 
as you could over the evening recess to determine 
if he was wrong about that? 
A. Not ~s such, really to say - to agree, I would have 
to d~sagree until we went through. I don't want 
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Q. I understand you can't say there is a possibility 
something is otherwise if yc.1 didn't look. I ar:; 
saying, from whatever looking you did do and from 
whatever knowledge you presently have, you are 
not presently aware of any instances that it was 
different from what he said? 
A. T~at is right, only what we have discussed. 
The effect of such judicial admissions is as stated in 
•~ C.J.S., Evidence, Section 381: 
The cases abound with statements and holdings 
that a judicial admission is generally con-
clusive on the party by whom it was made or to 
whom it is attributable, if, as has been stated, 
such judicial admission is made in the case on 
trial, and if unequivocal, and unexplained or 
uncontradicted, unless the court, in the exercise 
of its discretion, expressly permits him to wi~~­
draw his admission and relieves him from its 
effect by reason of its having been made by 
inadvertance or under a mistake of fact. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has noted that a verdict cannot 
::and even if there is evidence to support it, if the party in whose 
:lvor it was rendered has made a judicial admission of facts which 
luld not entitle him to the judgment. In Hallett v. Stone, 534 P.2d 
.]2 (Kan.l975) that Court stated: 
This court has frequently recognized that admissions 
made by a party are the strongest kind of evidence. 
The proposition or law to be applied ~~der these 
circumstances has been stated as follows: a 
verdict cannot be upset if there is any evidence 
in the record to support it, where such issue is 
clearly presented without complicating factors, 
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but such rule yields to the impact of admis-
sions mdd~ by a party in his cescimony while 
a witness in the case, and such admissions 
are binding and conclusive upon him if un-
contradicted or unexplained, whecher such 
admissions are elicited on direct examinacion 
or on cross-examination of the party. (Authority 
cited). 
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court in Gaswint v. Case, 509 
P.2d 19 (Ore.l973) in an action for wrongful discharge during the 
term of an employment contract, stated as follows: 
In this case, however, plaintiff admitted on 
cross-examination that only 50 percent of the 
estimated sum of $1,500, or $750, was expended 
in seeking other employment and this was binding 
upon him as a judicial admission. It follows 
that the trial court erred in its award to plain-
tiff of $1,115.37 as incidental damages to reim-
burse him for such expenses. It also follows 
that any such award to plaintiff may not properly 
exceed the sum of $750. 
Likewise, this Court has held that a witness's testimony on direct 
examination is no stronger than as it is left on cross-examination. 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954). 
The trial court erred in not applying the foregoing rule 
to the testimony of Mr. Dougherty since there was no reason to 
invoke the "interests of justice" exception. To the contrary, the 
interests of justice required that the rule be invoked to prevent 
the unjust enrichment that inures to an insruance company when it 
back-dates policies and endorsements to the date of the applica-
tion therefor and charges and collects a prenium from that date \.Jhen 
no loss has occurred, but then would repudiate che practice •..;hen a 
loss has occurred. There is no question but that if an endorse~ent 
involved an additional premium, it would be charged from the effectiVE 
back-dated date (R. 726). 
-//-
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It appears from the record that the trial court misconstrued 
:~e prerequisites to an implied agreement based on the conduct of 
:)e parties to require the affirmative consent of both parties to 
:~e implied agreement. During the testimony of Mr. Dougherty, the 
:ourt itself inquired as to the procedure which resulted in the 
:ack-dating practice in the following coloquy: 
THE COURT: What would the underwriter do physicallly 
to that application to indicate that the 
endorsement requested was approved: 
THE WITNESS: Generally they will just initial it as 
approved and get it--route it to the policy 
'Nriting department. 
THE COURT: And do you indicate the date on which it 
is approved? 
THE HITXESS: No, I think that is probably why a lot of 
these endorsements have the date of the 
agent's memo. The policy 'Nriting depart-
ment knows we have approved them and if 
it is not specific, you know, as to what 
the effective date is, they are picking 
up the date of the memo. That is the 
mechanics of it. 
THE COURT: Yet as I understand it, it isn't until you 
approve it that vou figure the pilot is 
included in the policv; is that correct? 
THE WIT:-1ESS: Yes, sir. (R. 680). 
'.~d. in the Court Memorandum ::lecision, it makes the observation: 
Broughton's note to Dyson, the receipt of which 
was denied, does not support an implication that 
as of that date Ranger was bound on Shannon and 
so understood it. (R. 263). 
The doctrlne of implied agreement based on a course of conduct 
~uld be meaningless if the parties had to affirmatively acknowledge 
re :1at the implied agreement r.vas intended. Under such circumstances, 
~would then have an express agreement. 
-23-
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Also, the trial court ignored the legal effect of Hr. Dyson's 
admission that back-dating of endorsements to the date of request 
by the agent was binding upon AOA/Ranger and did not require further 
proof of such course of conduct by Dyson. In its Hemorandum Decisior., 
the Court stated: 
... I have considered the testimony with respect 
to these other policies and do not find the facts 
support counsel's contention that a course of deal-
ing was established from which it can be found that 
coverage was binding upon submission of the pilot 
information and request for the change. (R. 261). 
The Court goes on to state that there were sufficient variations in 
the other policies to preclude such a finding. Even accepting such 
a finding on the evidence as we are required to do on appeallant 
review, does not vitiate the uncontroverted admission of l1r. Doughern 
that it was in fact the practice of AOA/Ranger to back-date endorse-
ments effective as of the date of request by the agent if the 
request contained all of the information necessary to rate the 
risk and no other date was requested, or obviously indicated such 
as adding a new plane effective as of the date of purchase or rene••i~g 
a policy effective as of the anniversary date of the policy. These 
were the types of situations found in some of the other policies 
which the trial court was referring to in its Hemorandum Decision. 
Appellants challenge repondents to support the trial court's 
finding by showing in the record one single occasion when AOA/Ranger 
did not back-date an endorsement to add a p.:.lot. co an exist1.ng poi.ic:· 
effective as of the date of the agent's request when all info~a­
tion necessary to rate the risk was submitted with the request for 
the addition of the pilot. 
-24-
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The reason give by Mr. Dougherty for the back-dating of 
1ch endorsements was as follows: 
Q. In response to my question, if you don't assume 
the pilot is flying the airplane until he gets 
your written endorsement, what is the purpose 
of pre-dating the effective date of the endorse-
ment? 
A. Well, really I could only repeat my last answer. 
We are looking for the best possible effective 
date for everyone involved. Quite often the 
person typing the endorsement wouldn't know 
exactly r..ffiat date I approved it. (R. 660). 
:nrently, however, this reason of "the best possible effective 
l:;:e for everyone involved" did not apply if a loss occurred be-
l::;een the request for the endorsement and the issuance of ::--..E:: 
.:me. 
Even if the trial court was not satisifed with the weight 
~d effect of appellant's evidence submitted in their case in chief, 
:cannot disregard the admissions of respondent's chief witness 
:;de in the course of his cross-exar.-tination. Especially when it 
j~contraverted that the last action taken by AOA/Ranger on the 
:::icy in question prior to the loss conformed ,.;ith Mr. Dougherty's 
:~ission, i.e., without telephone binder of any kind, Mrs. Cartwright 
ont a memo dated December 4, 1975 r..;ith pilot experience form 
::ached requesting the addition of Gary Ferguson as a covered 
:lot On the policy in question and '.Vithout further COllllllunication 
~my kind, AOA/Ranger issued such endorsement adding Ferguson as 
: ~ilot on t\'te policl ov an endorsemenc tvped December 10, 1975, 
lc back-dated effecti·Je as of Dece::!'lber 4, 1975, the date of Mrs. 
·l::t'.vright' s :nemo req~.eesti::1g the endorsement. 
-=s-
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However, ignoring Hr. Dougherty's admission and the 
acknowledged handling of the Ferguson endorsement, the trial court 
summarily found in its Memorandum Decision that: 
From the foregoing facts it is thus apparent that 
no written endorsement approving the addition of 
the name of Shannon as a pilot to Item 7 of the 
policy was ever issued. (R. 260). 
The question is not whether an endorsement adding Shannon was in 
fact issued, but rather, whether such an endorsement should have 
been issued considering the admitted practice of AOA/Ranger and its 
prior conduct with respect to the policy in question and who held 
the interim risk of loss while the request for the endorsement was 
being processed by AOA/Ranger. 
AOA and Ranger seek to avoid the interim risk of loss while 
the request for the addition of Shannon [an admittedly acceptable 
pilot] (R. 600) was being procecced in their offices on the ground 
that they had not received a response to Sara Broughton's memo of 
December 15. Such a position cannot be sustained for the reasons 
set forth in the following point. 
POINT III 
AOA VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO ACT UPON 
DYSONS' REQUEST TO ADD KENNETH 
SHANNON AS A PILOT. 
As a general rule of law, an insurance agent has a dut;T to 
promptly and competently act upon a request for the placement of 
insurance coverage. As stated in 43 ~.J~r.2~, 
As ~general rule, a broker or agent who, with 
a v~ew to compensation for his services under-
takes to procure insurance for another: and 
-26-
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unjustifiably and through his fault or neglect, 
fails to do sc, ~ill be held liable for anv 
damage resulting thereform. The agent or ~ 
broker is liable on the theory that he is the 
agent of the insured in negotiating for a 
policy and that he owes a duty to his prin-
cipal to exercise reasonable skill, care, and 
diligence in effecting the insurance. He may 
be sued for breach of contract or negligent 
default in the performance of a duty imposed 
by contract, at the election of his client. 
In Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., et al. v. Lea, et al., 401 
1
· 2d 650 (3rd Cir. 1968) the Court held that an insurance broker 
::st follow the instructions of its customer or be liable for damages 
:osulting from his failure to do so in the following language: 
If a ~roker or agent of the insured neg~ects c~ 
procure insurance, or does not follow instructions, 
or if the policv is void or materiallv defec-
tive, throu:o;h t::-~c agent's fault, he is. liable to 
his principal for any loss he may have sustained 
thereby. . It is generally considered that 
if the neglect or breach of dutv of s~ch broker 
results in loss to his principal. the broker 
is liable to the same extent as the insurer 
would have been liable had the insurance been 
properly effected, and must pay the resulting 
loss. (Emphasis added). 
~:ilarl:r. in Brm-m v. Coolev, 247 P.2d 868 C:~.N.l952) the Court staced: 
Under t!"le facts and circ'-l!:lstances in this case 
it is the deterninaticn of this court that 
Paul S Brm-m Has the agent of the appellee 
that he failed to perform r...-ith reasonable 
dili ence the instructions received trom his 
principa . that the appellee su tere amages 
proximating resulting fro~ that neglect, and: 
that the appellant is liable therefor. (Emphasis 
added). 
In Tal~ot v Countr~ ~ife Insurance Comoanv. 291 ~E2d 830 
1
.: . l.pp 19~3) the Court held that an a:.legation that five months 
-~sed between the app:ication for ~ire insurance and an uninsured 
d 
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fire loss stated a cause of action; and in Brand v. International 
Investors Insurance Company, 521 P.2d 423 (Okla.l974) a three week 
delay between an application for life insurance and the death of 
the applicant without a policy having been issued constituted a 
jury question as to the negligence of the agent. 
In the case at bar, Mrs. Cartwright made an unqualified 
request that Kenneth Shannon be added as a covered pilot in the 
following language: 
We enclose a pilot experience form completed 
by Kenneth Richard Shannon who is to be 
included as a pilot under the above captioned 
policy. We would appreciate your endorsement 
to this effect. Thanks. (Ex. 17) . 
It should be noted that the language of the memo does not 
condition the request by providing that the premium must remain 
the same or be increased only so much. The contention of AOA that 
it had to wait for confirmation of a premium increase of $100.00 
per year on a policy which already carried a premium of $1050.00 
(Ex. 5 and R. 631) is absurd and contrary to the evidence. 
The policy premium was increased $302.00 when the policy 
was changed to "limited commercial" and AOA admittedly did not knOii 
if that increase was approved by Dysons before the endorsement was 
issued, since it had dealt only with AGA (R. 716). Also, AOA kneli 
that the addtional $100.00 premium would be charged to the Dyson 
agency account (R. 720) and, therefore, the agency would be ultima: 
responsible to pay the premic:r:l, ,..._ ...... ,.. ... o-1-.,.. 
...., .... ~ ~....... ..... '- .... c. 
additional premium to the Dyson agency. 
-28-
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For AOA to contend that it had to "have an understanding 
:are going to pay (be paid] for what we do" (r. 716) before it 
~lt secure enough to act upon the unqualified instruction to add 
, ::.annan as a pilot which would increase the premium $100.00 per year, 
.:.en it had been doing business with the Dyson agency since February 
_j68 (Ex. 2) stretches one's imagination and smacks of afterthought. 
Appellants suggest that considering the duty of an insur-
'~ce broker to timely and competently act upon unqualified instruction 
::?rocure insurance as noted in the cases referred to above, that 
.: t!'lat broker (AOA) deems that it needs further confirmation to 
.::rease the policy premium by $100.00 per year, that t::te r:o:s?on-
:)ility for follow-up regarding that confir.nation should rest with 
:.t The record is undisputed that Sara Broughton did nothing to 
i :::ow-up on the request for coverage of Shar.nor: as a pilot after 
::egedly sending a reply memo to confirm the additional $100.00 
1 o: ?ear premium. 
I As hereinafter discussed, the record will not support ~he 
-:S'J.l:Jption that the Dyson agency received the Sara Broughton reply 
J~~ and, therefore, legally t::te burden could not be upon the Dyson 
-;mc:r to respond to it. 
Poi:n IV 
I:1 THE ABSE~lCE OF TESTI:!O~Y 7HAT 
THE SA~ BROCGH:'O(l ~!EHO :.JAS DEPOSITED 
l)l .::.. c:;-::::::::; STA7ES :-!AiL. D:C:?OS :CTORY, 
THERE IS 'lO PRESU':'PTION 'I'I-LU I'I' ~lAS 
RECEIVED 3Y :'HE DYSON AGE~KY. 
Respondents AOA.'~an;er ~n:roduced the testimony of Sara 
::'J.g!-lton [·,ia depos::.~:.c::~ 1nd :..r::.:"J res?ec: tc the question 
- 'l)-
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of the mailing of her memo of December 15, 1975, she stated: 
Q. What did you do after you ~ad written the memo? 
A. I mailed it back to the agent. 
Q. The agent being Dyson? 
A. And Associates. 
Q. And Associates? 
A. Yes sir. (R. 739-740). 
Respondents never laid a factual foundation as to how the 
mailing was accomplished and, consequently, Miss Broughton's testiiJc:: 
is nothing more than a conclusionary statement that she "mailed it " 
Her supervisor, Mr. Dougherty, testified regarding the mailing situa· 
tion as follows: 
Q. And then I suppose mail that goes out from the 
underwriting department is then turned over to 
the mail room people and they mail it out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Sara Broughton would not be an individual who 
would actually put the mail in a U.S. Hail 
receptacle, is she? 
A. No. (R. 608-609). 
In view of Mr. Dougherty's testimony, the trial court was obligated 
to accept the fact that Miss Broughton did not place the reply memo 
in question in a U.S. Mail depository and there was no evidence free 
anyone who might have done so. Therefore, the record is devoid 
any evidence upon which it can be found that a memo was in fact 
mailed back to the Dyson agency through tte United States mails. 
].I In a somewhat similar case, Coffey v. Polimeni, 188 F.2d5:! 
(9th Cir.l951), an insurance agent apparently misplaced a client's I 
-30-
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_:tter requesting insurance coverage and giving the necessary infor-
I 
:at ion to secure the same and wrote a letter to the customer read-
ising the customer of the required information. A fire occurred 
i:efore insurance coverage was effected and the jury trying the case 
':cund in favor of the customer and against the insurance agent. The 
::neth Circuit affirmed the finding and noted with respect to 





. .the record fails to indicate with any 
degree of clarity whether this letter of 
June 4 actually reached Polimeni. A copy 
of it was attached to Coffey's answer in 
the case and on the trial a carbon copy 
was introduced along with the remaining 
correspondence. . The burden of proof 
on this issue [mailing] was concededly on 
the defendant, [insurance agent] where ~he 
court placed it. 
the agent's obligation to act upon the request for insur-
court stated: 
Counsel argued that, assuming negligence, 
the correct rule is that no action will lie 
against an insurance agent for delay in 
acting on an application where no breach 
of legal duty to obtain insurance appears. 
They concede tha~ this view is at variance 
with the general trend of authority and with 
the great bulk of the decisions dealing 
immediately with the subject. A few commen-
tators and an occasional judge have criticized 
this line of decisions as unorthodox or 
unsupported by reason, but they appear to us 
to announce a salutorv rule. The thought 
they stand for is that the agent or company owes 
the applicant for insurance what amounts to 
a legal obligation to act with reasonable 
promrt~ess o~ his 2pplication, either by 
providing a desired coverage or by notifying 
the applicant of the rejection of the risk so 
that he may not be lulled into a feeling of 
security or put to prejudicial delay in seeking 
-H-
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protection elsewhere. Implicit in the case 
is Q ~ecognitior- thac these transactions are 
fundamentally unlike ordinary commercial or 
business dealings where a mere profit is the 
stake, so prone is the failure of insurance 
protection to result in irretrievable disaster 
to the individual. Those engaged in the insur-
ance business understand perfectly the particular 
urgency of the need for prompt attention in 
these matters. 
In a recent Eighth Circuit case, Leasing Associates, Inc. 
v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., et al., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.l97l), the 
majority and minority rules regarding mailing were discussed and 
according to that Court's interpretation of the rules, the evidence 
submitted in the instant case would not support a finding of "maili~.; 
under either rule. In that case, the testimony regarding mailing 
was as follows: 
Q. You assumed, then, that it went out? 
A. Yes, I assumed that it went out ... I cannot prove 
it ever got inside the mail box. All I can say is 
it went out of our office in the normal course of 
business. 
Q. You assumed that it did? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You don't know whether it ever got past your 
secretary's desk, do you? 
A. Yes, it came for my signature, I put it in 
my out box for the mail clerk to pick up and 
mail. 
The Circuit Court conceded that the question of mailing would be 
determined by Arkansas law, but could find "'C' _"..r!<a::sas ac;::~1or::_:::y 
directly on the question and, therefore, discussed the majoritv 
and minority rules as follows: 
The most analogous Arkansas case is .Dengler v. 
Dengler, 196 Ark. 193, 12 S.W.2d 340 (1938). 
-<?-
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There the evidentiary problem was whether 
defend~nt's ~es~i~ony that she personally 
mailed a particular letter was sufficiently 
precise to '"arrant a presumption that the 
letter was received. Of importance here is 
the fact that the tenor of the Arkansas Court's 
approach to the problem was cautiously to 
require clear proof of all the facets of a 
proper mailing, i.e., proper stamping, addres-
sing and posting. Moreover, the Arkansas 
Court's view of this type of evidence is 
clearly matched by its zealous protection of 
the debtor under Ark. Stat. §85-9-504(3) in 
Barker & Norton, supra. \.Je therefore are 
constrained to approach this question with 
the narrow view of Dengler, that "technicali-
ties that make for justice may not be casually 
disregarded." 120 S. W. 2d at 354. 
As shown by Annotations 25 A.L.K. 9, 13. suD~ 1 e­
l:lented at 85 A.L.R. 541, 544 and 3G Am.Jur2d 
Evidence §1119, the weight of authori:y holds 
the evidence here presented to be insufficient 
due to the failure to call the mail clerk to 
verify either that he mailed this particular 
letter or at least that it was his. custom to 
mail such letters. Thus if Arkansas were to 
adopt the "majority rule," reversal would 
here be reauired .... However, even if 
Arkansas law were in accord ,,.,ith the "minoritv," 
a jury finding that clerical personnal performed 
their duties in properly posting the mail would 
be permissible only if there were clear testimony 
by the executive as to the customary practice in 
his office and his actions in compliance therewith. 
The problel:l in this case, however, is that plain-
tiff's sole witness on this point, Dillinger, 
proffered no description of the o::ice practice 
from ',.,rhich a j ur:r could properly determine 
whether his actions were in accord ~ith it. 
He gave no indication as to who customarily 
did the basic acts as addressing, sealing and 
stamping the envelooes and whether he could 
verifv that he and his secretarv had done such 
of th;se as was ~heir customarv· dutv before he 
s~gned the letter and placed it in the tray ~~ 
~~s d2sk. ~~3 cc~cl~s~o~Jr~ statemen~ that ~t 
went out in the nor~al cour~e of business in 
my office as all :nail. does each dav" is simply 
not enough. "T'l.e essential elernentarv facts 
mav be shown b:' course ·)= '::Jusiness properly 
proved, but an offer of such proof . must 
be directed t~ fac:s and not to :nere conclusions. 
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of Des Moines, 
OS Iowa 7 2, 21 N.VJ 580, 53 1923,. Hl:E::: 
plaintiff may "show the essential facts con-
stituting transmission by mail by showing th~ 
course of business, it failed because there Ls 
no evidence in the record as to what this office 
routine may have been." Forrest v. Soverei~ Camp, 
W.O.W. 220 Iowa 478, 261 N.W. 802, 804 (1935 . 
"That may be rather technical but the appellee 
relies on a presumption which does not arise, 
unless the evidence itself discloses" the 
basic facts underlying it. Deniger v. Deniger, 
120 S.W.2d at 343. 
Accordingly, whichever view Arkansas might be 
deemed to follow, we are constrained to hold 
that the evidence is not adequate to support 
the requisite jury finding that notification 
was placed in the United States mail. 
Similarly, in the instant case, no evidence was offered unde: 
even the "minority" business routine rule as to who stamped, addresst 
posted or deposited mail of the type in question, and no evidence 
was offered that those who customarily perform such duties did in 
fact perform them during the time period in question. 
The trial court seemed to acknowledge the lack of proof of 
mailing in this regard by alleviating counsel's request to voir 
dire by statine: 
I would say this, the acceptance of the exhibit, 
[AOA's file copy] I would not interprete it as 
saying as proof you received it. (R. 632). 
Such being the case, AOA had a duty to process the instruction to 
add Shannon as a pilot without further confirmation, and not having 
done so is liable to Dysons for any liability they have incurred 
as a result of AOA's failure to so act. 
-34-
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POINT V 
AOA AND RA...'lGER WRONGFULLY DENIED 
COVERAGE FOR THE LOSS IN QUESTION. 
On the day after the loss in question, Mrs. Cartwright of 
':1e Dyson agency filed a First Notice of Claim (Ex. 18); and on 
'arch 31, 1976, the insured, Donald A. Dyson, filed a Proof of Loss 
~-:fidavit (Ex. 37). Respondents have not contended that Mr. Dyson 
.as not complied with the policy's applicable notice of loss require-
:ents. However, :1r. Thomas W. Lehman, one of AOA' s claims examiners 
' 603), advised the insured, Donald A. Dyson, by letter of March 
.J, 1976 (Ex. 38), one day before the P-::-oof of Loss A:":-:..:'i'Tit was 
1,:Iecuted, that !-lis claim \vas denied for the reason that: 
:1r. Shannon was not a named oilot unde-::- the 
terms of the policy nor did he qualify under 
the open pilot endorsement. Adcitionally, 
you warranted in the application :"or aircraft 
insurance that vou were the sole O'Nll.er of the 
aircraft. The records of the FAA and our 
further investigation indicates this informa-
tion was incorrect. 
At the time of the loss, AOA's underwriting depart;::ent and 
~:es •..;ere in Dallas and the claims depart:cJent was still in Beaumont 
11 603). Mr. Dougherty's first notice of the loss was a request 
·:1m the claims depart!:lent for a coc:1plete copy of the undenv--riting 
-ce (R. 603). He was ne'1er intervie·..:ed by the claims department 
il-603-604) and, therefore, the claims examiner, ~!r. Tom Lehman, 
I 
··c denied the loss could not have knovm about the underr..rriting 
''art;r,erlt' s aJ.mitceJ pra.ctice o:" back-dating endorsements to the 
':e of req'--lest, if the re1uest crcnC:Jined all information necessary 
-rate the risk_ 
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Mr. Lehman apparently went through the underwriting file 
and together with such other information as was available to him, 
determined the most plausible reasons for denying the loss--the 
fact that Mr. Shannon had not as yet been endorsed on the policy, 
giving no thought as to whether or not under AOA 1 s admitted 
practices and prior conduct on the policy Shannon should have been 
endorsed on the policy or who held the interim risk while the 
request for endorsement was being processed. In that regard, it 
is interesting to note that even the claims department did not deem 
a lack of response to Sara Broughton 1 s memo of December 15 request:.n; 
confirmation of an additional $100.00 per year premium charge as 
a good reason for denying the loss in its formal letter denying 
the claim (Ex. 38). 
Also, it should be noted that there is no contention that 
Mr. Shannon did not have the experience qualifications to be covered 
as a named pilot. That determination already had been made as is 
obvious from the fact that Sara Broughton 1 s alleged memo acknowledgec 
that he could be added for another $100.00 per year premium charge. 
The reasons given for the denial of coverage are (1) that 
Shannon had not been endorsed as a named pilot and (2) that Mr. Dyso~. 
had warranted in his application for the aircraft insurnace that he 
was the sole owner of the aircraft. As mentioned, ~r. Lehman did 
not even consider whether Shannon should have been so endorsed, or 
who held the interim risk:. 
-36-
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The second reason advanced by Hr. Lehman for declining 
::verage is totally inaccurate. Hr. Lehman states: 
Additionally, you warranted in the application 
for aircraft insurance that you were the sole 
owner of the aircraft. (Ex. 38). 
:.1 examination of the Application for Aircraft Insurance (Ex. 4) 
:~11 reveal no item number even requesting ownership information. 
:: is true that the policy (Ex. 3) states in item 8 of the declara-
:~on that the named insured is the sole owner unless otherwise 
.)cicated. Hm.;ever, the declaration sheet of the policy is prepared 
;: the offices of AOA and is signed by Thomas Dougherty on behalf of 
:.JA, not by Hr. Dyson. The most that can be said against Mr. Dyson 
~ that if upon receiving the policy he happened to note and to read 
:cat particular line item of the policv (of which there is no 
~idence) that he failed to call to the attention of AOA that there 
ere other owners of the aircraft. On the other hand, it is obvious 
:~at AOA' s underwriting department made such entry on the policy 
=~th no application information to support it. The general law 
:egarding an inaccuracy in an application for insurance. even when 
::is the fault of the insured, is as indicated in Couch on Insur-
;~c e 2 d , § 3 8 : 6 8 , p . 3 8 2 : 
It is well settled, whether the risk is that 
of life, accident, or fire, that where an appli-
cation for insurance is Qade in •Nriting, and the 
questions therein as to material facts are 
unanswered or incompletely answered, and the 
insurer, without further inquiry, issues the 
policv, it thereby waives all right to a 
disclosure, or to a more complete answer with 
respect to the fact to which the unanswered 
question or incompletely answered question 
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the absence of clear proof of a fraudulent 
or !.ntentiunal supp.Ct2S::,.i..uu u[ Ch€. f3.C~, 
be avoided on the ground of concealment or 
of incomplete answers. 
In support of this rule, the text cites approxiraately 80 cases frow 
35 jurisdictions. The text further states at §37:555, p. 164: 
Although knowledge of the insured's breach of 
the ownership clause is ordinarily essential 
to effect a waiver or an estoppel, the insurer 
cannot assert its lack of knowledge of the breach 
when it is the insurer's own fault that it was not 
informed. That is, where the insurer fails to 
inquire of the insured it is generally deemed 
charged with knowledge of the facts as to which 
it did not inquire, even though the ownership 
clause is a requirement of the standard policy. 
So it is declared that when an insurance company 
insures property without inquiring into the state 
of title to such property before issuing the 
policy, it waives the ownership clause, and the 
policy is valid, provided the insured has suffi-
cient title or interest to sustain the contract 
of insurance. (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case, since the application form used by 
AOA did not request ownership information, it must be held to 
have waived such information. Donald A. Dyson was a one-fifth (1/5) 
owner of the aircraft and had sufficient ownership interest in the 
aircraft to sustain a contract of insurance. Under such arrangement. 
he would hold in trust four-fifths (4/5) of any proceeds recovered 
under the insurance policy for the benefit of the other joint owners 
Further, Mr. Dougherty acknowledged that the existence of 
additional owners who were not yet flying the aircraft •would not 
increase the underwriting risk or the policy premium (R. 657) :~e 
company, of course, would know when such owners became pi.lots beca'J5' 
they would have to be endorsed as named pilots on the polic7 and ~~ 
company could then adjust the premium if it deemed it aoprcpriate 
-38-
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It is clear that ADA/Ranger suffered no prejudice in not 
~~g awar= that there were uther owners of che aircraft at the 
::::1e the policy 1vas issued, and since the reason they did not know 
~s because they did not ask for such information in their standard 
;~plication form, the fact that the application did not reveal such 
~Jformation cannot justly be used as a reason for denying coverage 
::the loss in question. 
POHTT IJI 
THE TRIAL COCRT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELL&~TS' RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
This case was originally set for trial on ~cnday, September 
:977. On \.Jednesday, September 14, appellants personaL:· served 
:Junsel for t!le other parties '.Vith copies of a demand for jury 
::~al and fEed the original '.vit!l the Clerk of Court on Thursday, 
::Jtember 15. On Thursda:; and Friday, the ot:O.e:::- ?~rties by various 
~=adings moved to strike t!le demand. Judge Croft, to whom the 
:;se was assigned, wit!:out hearing, granted said motions and struck 
:JPellants' demand for jury trial on Friday, September 16 by a 
:::e?hone cal: to appellants' counsel's office. 
Admittedly, the demand for jury trial did not fully comply 
~ch Rule 5.:2 of the Rules of Practice in t!le Dis::rict Courts of 
".eState of Utah ·.vhich pro·.rices t!lat a demand for jury trial shall 
'Jade ten (lQ) days ?rio::- to t:::-ial, but the demand ~as served and 
::cd sufficientlv in acivar.ce c: t:Ce trial date to provide opposing 
runsel adequate time to their requests for instructions and 
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to permit the Clerk's office to call a jury in its regular course 
of handling such matters. Counsel had three (3) weekdays prior to 
the date of trial in which to prepare requests and the Clerk's office 
had two (2) weekdays in which to call a jury. The Clerk's office 
rountinely does not call a jury for a Monday trial until late Friday 
afternoon when it has been determined that there will be a Judge 
available the following Monday to try the case. 
This Court has long since held that opposing parties have no 
standing to contest a parties' application for a jury trial, althougr. 
such application is not made in the precise manner and at the precise 
time prescribed by rule or statute. Davis v. Denver and Rio Grande 
Railroad Company, 45 Utah 1, 142 Pac. 705 (1914). The granting or 
denying of an application for jury trial not made strickly in accord 
with rules of Court is, concedely, a matter of discretion. Hunter 
v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242,198 P.2d 245 (1948);Webb v. Hebb, 116 
Utah 155, 209 P.2d 201 (1949). 
However, appellants contend that the denial of a demand for 
jury trial which is made sufficiently in advance of trial so as to not 
prejudice the opposing parties or inconvenience the normal operation 
of the Clerk's office is an abuse of such discretion, since there '..laS: 
no real reason to deny such a very basic and substantial rigLt of a 
party in the American system of jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
The salient facts in this case are unciisputed in the record. 
i.e., that AOA/Ranger had succumbed to the practice, intentional or 
unintentional, of back-dating requests for endorsements adding namec 
pilots to existirg policies effective as of the date of the 
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:equest therefor, if the request contained all information necessary 
:orate the risk; and AOA had so treated the request [Ferguson) most 
:ecent to the request in question [Shannon] on the Dyson policy. 
cJCJ a practice is legally tantamount to extending binding authority 
:o the writing agent, since to hold otherwise gives the insurance 
:Jmpany the unfair advantage of requiring the insured to hold the 
:isk of loss •.-Jhile the request for endorsement is being processed 
·"the company's offices, but allowing it to charge the insured for 
::te endorsement from the date of the request if the same is accepted, 
ien no loss has occurred and, consequently, the company knows that 
·.:.ere has been no risk incurred during the time beto.veen ':!"-.e agent's 
~~est for the endorsement and the date of its issuance. 
The evidence of such conduct was the testimony of AOA's 
:nior Vice-President in charge of undenrc-iting on cross-exaoination 
·.d such evidence is conclusive on that issue and the trial court 
~ed in finding that appellants had not proved such a course of 
1t-::1duct. Procedurally, it is not necessary to prove what is admitted. 
There was a legal duty imposed upon AOA/Ranger to promptly 
; .;d competently process the request for endorsement of Shannon as 
1~ed pilot to the policy in question. That duty was not legally 
o:minated by the mailing of a request to confirm the additional 
.:o. 00 per year premium to be charged for the endorsement when there 
'' insufficient evidence ;:>roferred at trial to raise a presumption 
• mailing 
Therefore, AOA-'Ranger ·.vron~fully and unjustlv denied coverage 
the loss in question .w. t'-le ':Jasis that s:,annon "•.vas not a named 
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pilot under the terms of the policy," which begs the real issue 
of whether or not AOA's back-dating practice constituted implied 
binding authority on the part of the writing agency and required 
AOA/Ranger to hold the risk of loss during the time the request 
for endorsement was being processed. The further reason given 
for denial of coverage--that Dyson had "warranted in the application 
for aircraft insurance that you were the sole owner of the aircraft" 
and that such representation was untrue was without merit since the 
application signed by Dyson did not give any information regarding 
ownership. The application form was one supplied by AOA and since 
it did not request such information, AOA must be deemed to have 
waived it and cannot now be permitted to use the absence of such 
information as a justifiable basis for denial of the loss in 
question. 
Since the Dyson agency properly submitted a request for the 
endorsement of Shannon as a named pilot, including his pilot experie~:e 
form, to AOA, under AOA's admitted practice of back-dating such 
endorsements it should be held that AOA held the risk of loss while 
the request for the Shannon endorsement was being processed in AOA's 
office, and the Court erred in finding that Dyson was not entitled 
to recover the amount of the policy coverage from Ranger Insurance 
Company and in its finding that Dysons had not fulfilled their duties 
to the other plaintiff Owners. If AOA/Ranger had promptly processec 
the request for the Shannon endorsement, the O'ATners would 110~" bc;ve 
suffered the loss in question. The loss sustained was due to AOA's 
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~glect, not that of Dysons'. However, even if it is held that the 
)ysons are technically liable to the plaintiff Owners since the 
:Jannon endorsement was in fact not issued prior to the time of the 
~oss in question, then the trial court erred in not granting Dysons 
~udgment over against AOA/Ranger for the latter's failure to promptly 
::-ocess the request for the endorsement and in failing to find that 
IDA/Ranger held the risk of loss during the time such request was 
)eing processed. 
Further the trial court erred and abused its discretion in 
:e:1?ing Dysons' demand for trial by jury since the same '.vas served 
~d filed sufficiently in advance of the trial date to c~use no 
::ejudice to the opposing parties nor interference 
I :;untine in processing requests for jury trial. 
with the Clerk's 
I \'~REFORE, appellants pray that this Honorable Court reverse 
:'.e judgment of the trial court by directi:1g that judgment be entered 
.: ::.favor of Donald A. Dyson against AOA/Ranger on plaintiffs' Complain, 
::that judgment be entered in favor of Donald A. Dyson and L. F. 
~son & Associates on their Counterclaim against AOA/Ranger in the 
'.:aunt of any j·Jdg:nent found in favor of the Owners against the 
.::sons. 
Alternatively, appellants pray that the action be remanded 
:, the Third Judicial Discrict Court i:-1 and for Salt Lake County for 
::~al by jur:1 Dursuant to aopel:.an':s' demand therefor prior to the 
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Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1978. 
H. WAYNE I.JADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & Cill~BELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants Donald 
A. Dyson and L. F. Dyson & 
Associates, Inc. 
WALLACE R. LAUCmWR 
of and for 
BAYLE & LAUCHNOR 
200 South Main, #1105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies 
Jf the foregoing Appellants' Brief to each counsel for the parties 
as designated below on the 
RA~OND A. HINTZE 
WALKER & HINTZE 
day of July, 1978. 
4685 Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attornevs for Respondents Stephen 
F. Kesler, W. T. Bissell, Ronald 
~cClain, Donald L. Oborn and Elmo Walker 
R. CLARK A.'R.."iOLD 
REYNOLDS & -~~OLD 
922 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent Garv Ferguson 
STUA.~T L. POEL~~ 
S~WW, CHRISTENSEN & l·lARTINEAU 
200 South Main, #700 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101 
Attornevs for Res::>ondents Aviation 
Otfice of America, Inc. and Ranger 
Insurance Comoanv 
H. ~~AYNE WADSHORTH 
Of Appellants' Attorneys 
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